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ACHIEVING FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS FOR
OKLAHOMA’S JUVENILES: THE ROLE FOR
COMPETENCY IN JUVENILE PROCEEDINGS
MARY SUE BACKUS*
Introduction
As a matter of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, a criminal
defendant has a constitutional right to be competent to stand trial.1 In fact,
at all stages of the criminal justice process a defendant must be able to
understand the proceedings and be capable of consulting with and assisting
his lawyer with his defense.2 Although the United States Supreme Court
has held that the Due Process Clause requires that criminal defendants must
be competent, the Court has never addressed whether that competency
requirement applies to juvenile proceedings. Left to their own devices on
this issue, an overwhelming majority of states have established, either
through statute or case law, a right to competence in juvenile proceedings.3
In fact, experts in the field consider the question to be “settled” and often
cite Oklahoma as the lone exception.4
In contrast to the overwhelming majority of states, the Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeals has found that extending the right of adjudicative
competence5 to juveniles is neither appropriate nor necessary.6 That
conclusion was based on the rehabilitative nature of juvenile proceedings
and the court’s confidence in the juvenile system’s capacity to consider and
* Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma College of Law. An earlier version of
this article appeared in the Oklahoma Bar Journal, Competency in Juvenile Delinquency
Proceedings, 82 OKLA. B.J. 20 (2011).
1. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966).
2. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960).
3. Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, Developmental Incompetence, Due Process,
and Juvenile Justice Policy, 83 N.C. L. REV. 793, 801 (2005).
4. Id. at 833-34; see also IVAN KRUH & THOMAS GRISSO, EVALUATION OF JUVENILES’
COMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL 20 (2009) (“It is now a ‘virtually inescapable conclusion’ that
CST [competence to stand trial] is required in juvenile court.” (internal citation omitted)).
5. The terms “competence to stand trial” and “adjudicative competency” will be used
interchangeably throughout this article. The term “competence to stand trial,” or CST, is the
traditional term that has been in use for centuries. With the shift away from criminal trials to
a system wherein plea bargains account for the vast majority of criminal cases, the term
“adjudicative competence” more accurately reflects the broad array of criminal proceedings
where competence is required to proceed. See PATRICIA A. ZAPF & RONALD ROESCH,
EVALUATION OF COMPETENCE TO STAND TRIAL 5-6 (2009).
6. G.J.I. v. State, 778 P.2d 485, 487 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989).
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accommodate issues of mental health in adjudicating young Oklahomans as
delinquent. Over two decades have passed since the court staked out what
is now an atypical approach to juvenile competency. Dramatic changes in
the juvenile system combined with new insights on adolescent brain
development suggest that it is time for Oklahoma to reevaluate its outlier
position and acknowledge that it is necessary to address issues of juvenile
competency in order to ensure the fundamental fairness to which juveniles
are entitled.
The appropriate role of juvenile competence is a complex question,
however. To say that an overwhelming majority of states incorporates a
right to competency in juvenile proceedings is not to say that there is any
consistency or universal agreement on what that standard should be or
precisely when it applies.7 Because a juvenile may be treated in a number
of different ways under the Oklahoma criminal code, —as a juvenile, as an
adult, or as a hybrid youthful offender—questions of juvenile adjudicative
competence can arise in different contexts and thus may require different
approaches. Even if Oklahoma is able to maintain its parens patriae
philosophy in juvenile adjudications, with a judge acting as a benevolent
parent in the best interests of the child to meet individualized, rehabilitative
goals, that philosophy is not the primary motivating construct when a
juvenile is tried or sentenced as an adult or Youthful Offender. Where
considerations of punishment trump rehabilitation, it is an illusion that the
traditional juvenile court philosophy can adequately address a juvenile’s
right to competency and ensure fundamental fairness in juvenile
proceedings as required by the Supreme Court.8
This article considers Oklahoma’s outlier position on the right of
juveniles to be competent before being adjudicated in juvenile court. More
specifically, it raises questions about the applicability of the rejection of
that right in G.J.I. v. Oklahoma9 to juveniles tried or sentenced as adults or
youthful offenders. Part I begins with a discussion of the fundamental due
process right of competence, including its rationale and the legal criteria
established for finding adult criminal defendants incompetent. Part II
7. Richard E. Redding & Lynda E. Frost, Adjudicative Competence in the Modern
Juvenile Court, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 353, 369-74 (2001) (describing the variation
among states in statutory provisions and case law relating to adjudicative competence in the
juvenile court).
8. “[T]he applicable due process standard in juvenile proceedings, as developed by
Gault and Winship, is fundamental fairness.” McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543
(1971).
9. 778 P.2d 485 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989).
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explores the evolution of the modern juvenile justice system and the three
trends prompting states to develop competency policies to ensure
fundamental fairness in juvenile proceedings. Part III considers how the
three trends in juvenile justice are reflected in Oklahoma’s approach to
juveniles and identifies two points in the system where the lack of a
competence right raises significant due process concerns.
I. The Right to Competence
The doctrine that a criminal defendant should not be tried while mentally
incompetent is firmly entrenched in English and American legal history
with roots dating at least to mid-seventeenth-century England. Blackstone,
who recognized that a defendant should neither plead nor be tried if
mentally defective, wrote that a defendant who became "mad" after the
commission of an offense should not be arraigned "because he is not able to
plead . . . with the advice and caution that he ought," and should not be
tried, for "how can he make his defense?"10 Another early and frequently
cited English formulation for judging adjudicative competence required the
jury first to consider whether a defendant was “mute of malice or not;
secondly, whether he can plead to the indictment or not; thirdly, whether he
is of sufficient intellect to comprehend the course of proceedings on the
trial . . . .”11
In the nineteenth century, United States federal courts adopted these
British common law rules virtually intact. Federal courts cited common
law authority, for example, to hold that “[i]t is not ‘due process of law to
subject an insane person to trial upon an indictment involving liberty or
life.’”12 Early American decisions also echoed Blackstone’s concern about
the inability of an incompetent defendant to mount a defense, framing the
question as whether a defendant is able “to properly and intelligently aid his
counsel in making a rational defense.”13 Other courts considered whether
the defendant was “capable of properly appreciating his peril and of
rationally assisting in his own defense.”14
Mirroring this common law understanding, the U.S. Supreme Court
crafted a test of incompetence in its landmark decision in Dusky v. United

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *24.
King v. Pritchard, 173 Eng. Rep. 135, 135 (1836).
Youtsey v. United States, 97 F. 937, 941 (6th Cir. 1899) (internal citation omitted).
United States v. Chisolm, 149 F. 284, 286 (C.C.S.D. Ala. 1906).
United States v. Boylen, 41 F. Supp. 724, 725 (D. Or. 1941).
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States.15 The legal standard for competency focuses on a defendant’s
functional capabilities as they relate to participation in the trial process:
“[T]he ‘test must be whether [a defendant] has sufficient present ability to
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding—and whether he has a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him.’”16 In Drope v. Missouri the
Court further clarified that a competent defendant must be able to “assist in
preparing his defense.”17 Through Dusky and Drope, the Supreme Court
has articulated three separate factors required for competency. In order to
be competent, defendants must be able to: (1) consult with defense
counsel; (2) otherwise assist with their defense; and, (3) have a rational and
factual understanding of the proceedings.18
In Oklahoma, as in every other state,19 this fundamental constitutional
right is embodied in a general competency statute which mirrors the
Dusky/Drope standard. The Oklahoma statute states: “No person shall be
subject to any criminal procedures after the person is determined to be
incompetent . . . .”20 and defines incompetence as the “present inability of a
person arrested for or charged with a crime to understand the nature of the
charges and proceedings brought against him or her and to effectively and
rationally assist in his or her defense.”21
Since the standard established in Dusky and Drope, the Supreme Court
has repeatedly and consistently recognized that the criminal trial of an
incompetent defendant violates due process, emphasizing that this basic
requirement is the foundation for a host of other rights essential to a fair
trial.22 This functional focus of the standard recognizes that competence is
required to exercise vital trial rights. Justice Kennedy described the
fundamental nature of the right as follows:
Competence to stand trial is rudimentary, for upon it depends the
main part of those rights deemed essential to a fair trial,
including the right to effective assistance of counsel, the rights to
summon, to confront, and to cross-examine witnesses, and the

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

362 U.S. 402 (1960).
Id. at 402 (internal citation omitted).
420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975).
Id.; Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402.
Zapf & Roesch, supra note 5, at 8.
22 OKLA. STAT. § 1175.2(A) (2011).
Id. § 1175.1(2).
Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 354 (1996) (internal citations omitted).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol65/iss1/2

2012]

FAIRNESS FOR OKLAHOMA’S JUVENILES

45

right to testify on one's own behalf or to remain silent without
penalty for doing so.23
The accuracy and fairness of our criminal justice system depends upon
the capability of the advocates to marshal the facts in support of their
position and fully present their evidence. When each side is fully
developed and zealously presented, the judge or jury is in the best position
to ascertain the truth. Thus, proceeding against an incompetent defendant
who is incapable of assisting his attorney to fully present the evidence is
contrary to the adversary process itself and undermines the validity of the
verdict as well as public confidence in the criminal justice system.24
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court has characterized the right to
competence as “fundamental to an adversary system of justice,”25 the
practical application of this very general legal standard is challenging, both
in its substance and in its frequency. Judges, juries, prosecutors, defense
attorneys, and mental health professionals are all called upon to consider
issues of competency. Although accurate statistics of incompetent criminal
defendants are hard to come by, the prevalence of mental health problems
in the prison population, which is well documented,26 suggests that mental
health issues are common among those who come into contact with the
criminal justice system.27 According to the American Bar Association
23. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 139-40 (1992) (internal citations omitted).
24. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that "[t]he very premise of our
adversary system of criminal justice is that partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will
best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free."
Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975); see also United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S.
225, 230-31 (1975) ("We have elected to employ an adversary system of criminal justice in
which the parties contest all issues before a court of law. The need to develop all relevant
facts in the adversary system is both fundamental and comprehensive. The ends of criminal
justice would be defeated if judgments were to be founded on a partial or speculative
presentation of the facts. The very integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in
the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts . . . .") (quoting United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974)).
25. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975).
26. The U.S. Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics has found that more than
half of the prison and jail inmates have mental health problems. See DORIS J. JAMES &
LAUREN E. GLAZE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT:
MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES at 1 (No. NCJ 213600, 2006),
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=789.
27. Mental illness obviously may impact competency, but mental illness alone does
not inevitably result in a finding of incompetence. See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL
HEALTH STANDARDS 175 (1989) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS] (“If defendants are capable
of meeting the articulated requirements for competence, the presence or absence of mental
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(ABA), competency is, quantitatively speaking, “the single most important
issue in the criminal mental health field.”28 Estimates indicate that between
two percent and eight percent of all criminal defendants are referred for
competency evaluations, resulting in nearly 60,000 or more annual
competency evaluations in the United States.29
In addition to its frequency, the substance of the competence
determination remains challenging. Because the Dusky/Drope standard
provides few specifics, practitioners have identified a number of
competence-related abilities used to assess competence, including the
ability to understand the charges, the current legal situation, relevant facts,
legal issues and procedures, the roles of court personnel, and potential legal
defenses and dispositions.30 Nevertheless, professional evaluators have
struggled with the application of the general competency standards to
individual defendants. With a competency standard that speaks in terms of
a reasonable degree of rational understanding, the inquiry is by its nature
illness is irrelevant. Conversely, defendants may not be mentally ill yet may be incompetent
to stand trial. Legal criteria, not medical or psychological diagnostic categories, govern
competency. Hence, the presence or absence of mental illness, while certainly significant in
evaluating defendant competence is by no means conclusive.”).
In contrast, the federal Insanity Defense Reform Act appears to require that
incompetence be a result of a mental disease or defect. That statute states that in
determining mental competency to stand trial or to undergo post-release proceedings, a court
must find that the defendant is “presently suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering
him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and
consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 4241(d) (2006).
28. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 27, at 168.
29. Zapf & Roesch, supra note 5, at 3; see also Douglas Mossman et al., AAPL Practice
Guideline for the Forensic Psychiatric Evaluation of Competence to Stand Trial, J. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & LAW, 35, S3-S72 (2007), available at http://www.jaapl.org/content/
35/Supplement_4/S3.full (citing statistics showing a significant increase in the frequency of
competence evaluations from 25,000-36,000 in 1973 to 50,000 in 1998 to 60,000 in 2000).
30. According to one source, the following relevant areas of inquiry are the best practice
in forensic mental health assessment for competence: (1) capacity to understand the arrest
process; (2) capacity to comprehend and appreciate the charges or allegations; (3) capacity
to disclose to counsel pertinent facts, events, and states of mind; (4) capacity to comprehend
and appreciate the range and nature of potential penalties that may be imposed; (5) capacity
to appreciate the likely outcome of the proceedings; (6) basic knowledge of legal strategies
and options; (7) capacity to engage in reasoned choice of legal strategies and options
(decision making); (8) capacity to understand the adversarial nature of the proceedings; (9)
capacity to manifest appropriate courtroom behavior; (10) capacity to participate in trial;
(11) capacity to testify relevantly; and (12) relationship with counsel. Zapf & Roesch, supra
note 5, at 181-83.
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flexible and context dependent.31 But even though it would seem that there
may be degrees of competency, where a defendant is capable of making
some decisions but not others, the Supreme Court has nonetheless made it
clear that competency is an either/or proposition. A defendant is either
competent or he is not for all adjudicative proceedings, including the right
to waive counsel or to plead guilty.32 Whatever the inquiry, the central
rationale underlying the right to competency remains: the fairness and
accuracy of the criminal process require the lucid participation of the
accused in his own defense.33
All of the U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the right to
competency has been in the context of adult criminal defendants. Despite
its unequivocal insistence that fairness dictates that incompetent defendants
may not be tried, the Court has never addressed the question of whether
juveniles are afforded that same due process right. Likewise, the Oklahoma
general competency statute does not explicitly address whether it applies to
juveniles. Oklahoma, however, flatly rejected the right to competency in
juvenile proceedings in the 1989 case of G.J.I. v. Oklahoma.34
Thirteen-year-old G.J.I. claimed that he was incompetent to aid his
defense attorney at his delinquency hearing for attempted second degree
rape and that he was entitled to a competency hearing.35 The Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals endorsed the trial court’s view that the state’s
general competency statutes simply are not applicable to juvenile
proceedings. Despite the fact that G.J.I. had a “demonstrable mental
illness,” a low I.Q., and suffered from major depression and conduct
disorder of adolescence, the court held that it was neither appropriate nor

31. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 27, at 175 (“A determination of competence or
incompetence is functional in nature, context-dependent and pragmatic in orientation, and
should be viewed as such by both courts and mental health and mental retardation
professionals.”).
32. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 398-401 (1993).
33. Of course, rationales other than fairness support the right to competency, such as
maintaining the dignity and decorum of the criminal justice system by not having
incompetent defendants disrupt the proceedings. In addition, several justifications for
punishment of offenders are weakened if punishment is inflicted on those who cannot
comprehend why they are being punished. There is little in the way of specific deterrence or
retribution if a defendant does not understand what is happening to him and why. While
these other valid justifications support a right to competency, the primary significance of
competence is the key role it plays in ensuring a fair trial. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note
27, at 170.
34. 778 P.2d 485 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989).
35. Id. at 487.
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necessary to extend the protections of the competency statutes to his jury
trial, where he was found delinquent.36 The court based its reasoning on the
nature of the juvenile proceedings, which it characterized as “specifically
not criminal” and “directed towards rehabilitation.”37 Because G.J.I’s
mental disorders were considered by the court and presumably would be a
factor in his disposition plan, the court found the juvenile procedures were
“a comprehensive substitute for the competency statutes.”38
Oklahoma is the only state to reject explicitly the doctrine of adjudicative
competence in juvenile court.39 If the rationale of G.J.I. continues to hold
true, that the nature of juvenile proceedings inherently considers issues of
competence in adjudicating and treating juveniles, then Oklahoma’s outlier
position is of no concern. But, as the only state to reject explicitly the right
in juvenile adjudications, it is reasonable to reexamine the Oklahoma
approach to juvenile competency in the face of the overwhelming
consensus of virtually every other state, particularly in light of the three
trends that have been shaping the evolution of the modern juvenile system
and persuading most states to develop policies on juvenile competence.
Those trends include the due process revolution in the juvenile court, the
increasing punitive and adversarial nature of juvenile proceedings, and a
growing scientific understanding of adolescent brain development.
II. The Evolving Juvenile Court
The concept of the juvenile court as a separate legal institution is only a
little over a century old.40 First established in Chicago in 1899, the separate
juvenile court concept spread rapidly across the United States so that by the
early 1940s, all states had enacted legislation establishing separate courts
for juvenile offenders.41
Based on the notion that juveniles are
developmentally different than adults and more amenable to treatment and

36. Id. at 486.
37. Id. at 487.
38. Id.
39. Redding & Frost, supra note 7, at 372.
40. For a general description of the history of juvenile courts in the United States, see
COAL. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, A CELEBRATION OR A WAKE? THE JUVENILE COURT AFTER 100
YEARS: 1998 ANNUAL REPORT (1998).
41. See H. Warren Dunham, The Juvenile Court: Contradictory Orientations in
Processing Offenders, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 508, 508-09 (1958). Connecticut and
Wyoming were the final two states to establish juvenile courts; all other states had followed
Illinois's lead by 1923. Id. at 509.
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rehabilitation, juvenile courts embodied a parens patriae philosophy.42
Juvenile courts were to act as a benevolent parent in the best interests of the
child and the central tenets guiding the court were protection, treatment,
and rehabilitation rather than punishment and retribution. The juvenile
court judge was envisioned as a father figure, putting his arm around the
child and “draw[ing] the lad to him” in order to intervene and save the child
from a life of crime.43 The jurisdiction of the juvenile court included all
youth in need of intervention from the state, including abused or neglected
children in need of protection and supervision.44 As a result, young
offenders were treated using the same informal, discretionary, and
essentially diagnostic procedures used in those cases, where a child’s best
interests, background, and welfare dictated the disposition.
Thus,
proceedings involving juvenile offenders were described as civil rather than
criminal; constitutional requirements restricting state action when an
individual's liberty was at stake were considered irrelevant.45
Issues of juvenile competency had little relevancy in the traditional
juvenile court system where informal proceedings were designed to take
into account a juvenile’s immaturity and incompetence to reach a
rehabilitative result. The need for a juvenile competency right, however,
has emerged with the modern evolution of juvenile courts. Three
significant changes have fueled this evolution and resulted in the increased
salience of juvenile competence—the due process revolution, the increasing
punitive nature of the system, and new scientific research on adolescent
brain function and development. It is primarily these changes that have
prompted a majority of states to establish a right to competency in juvenile
proceedings.
A. The Juvenile Due Process Revolution
In the 1960s and 1970s, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the concern
that the actual performance of juvenile courts was failing to fulfill their
42. The Latin phrase, parens patriae, means "parent of his or her country," and is
defined as "the state in its capacity as provider of protection to those unable to care for
themselves." BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1144 (8th ed. 2004). Justice Fortas explained in In
re Gault that the Latin phrase "was taken from chancery practice, where, however, it was
used to describe the power of the state to act in loco parentis for the purpose of protecting
the property interests and the person of the child." 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967) (internal citations
omitted).
43. Julian Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 107, 120 (1909).
44. See Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691,
695 (1991).
45. Id.
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original laudable purposes and stepped in to curb perceived shortcomings
and abuses of this informal system. Disturbed that “the child receives the
worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults
nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children,”46
the Court ushered in an era of due process requirements for juveniles.
Through a series of decisions, the Court transformed the informal, highly
discretionary juvenile justice system into a more adversarial, formalized
structure.
The Court first addressed the serious deficiencies of the juvenile court in
Kent v. United States:
While there can be no doubt of the original laudable purpose
of juvenile courts, studies and critiques in recent years raise
serious questions as to whether actual performance measures
well enough against theoretical purpose to make tolerable the
immunity of the process from the reach of constitutional
guaranties applicable to adults. There is much evidence that
some juvenile courts . . . lack the personnel, facilities and
techniques to perform adequately as representatives of the State
in a parens patriae capacity, at least with respect to children
charged with law violation. There is evidence, in fact, that there
may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of
both worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to
adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment
postulated for children.47
Sixteen year old Morris Kent, convicted of housebreaking and robbery in
adult criminal court, raised a number of issues in his appeal to the U.S.
Supreme Court.48 The Court, however, addressed only the narrow issue of
whether the waiver process, where the juvenile court waived jurisdiction
and transferred Kent to adult criminal court, was fair. Interpreting the
Washington, D.C. statute at issue, the Court found the waiver process

46. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
47. Id. at 555-56.
48. Id. at 552. Kent raised a long list of grounds for reversal, including: his detention
and interrogation were unlawful; his parents were not notified of his arrest; he was deprived
of his liberty for about a week without a determination of probable cause; he was
interrogated by the police in the absence of counsel or a parent and without warning of his
right to remain silent or advice as to his right to counsel; he was fingerprinted while
unlawfully detained; and that the fingerprints were unlawfully used. In addition, Kent cited
a number of errors by the district court. Id.
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defective and that Kent was entitled to a hearing, access to social records or
reports available to the juvenile court, and to a statement of reasons for the
waiver and transfer decision.49 Although the Court declined to make a
sweeping pronouncement on the constitutional reach of juvenile due
process rights,50 it did hold “that the hearing must measure up to the
essentials of due process and fair treatment.”51
A year after Kent, the Court was more explicit on “the essentials of due
process and fair treatment” in a watershed decision that has attained near
iconic status in juvenile justice, In re Gault. In Gault the Court again
questioned the legitimacy and efficacy of the parens patriae rationale and
noted “that unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is
frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure.”52 Gerald Gault
was a fifteen-year-old boy charged with making an obscene phone call to a
female neighbor.53 He was convicted by an Arizona juvenile court and
committed to a juvenile facility for an indeterminate time not to extend
beyond his twenty-first birthday.54 An adult convicted of the same offense
in criminal court would have faced a maximum of two months in jail or a
fine of $5 to $50.55 Gault’s parents were not notified that he was in
custody, the delinquent petition filed against him did not contain any factual
allegations, and the only testimony against him at the adjudicatory hearing
was given by a probation officer who had investigated the case and
prepared the petition.56 The complaining witness did not testify, there was
no record made of the proceeding, and Gault was not represented by an
attorney at the hearing.57
In finding that young Gault’s due process rights had been violated,
Justice Fortas, writing for the Court, proclaimed that “it would be
extraordinary if our Constitution did not require the procedural regularity
and the exercise of care implied in the phrase ‘due process.’ Under our
Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo

49. Id. at 553-54.
50. “The Juvenile Court Act and the decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit provide an adequate basis for decision of this case, and we
go no further.” Id. at 556.
51. Id. at 562.
52. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18 (1967).
53. Id. at 4.
54. Id. at 7-8.
55. Id. at 8-9.
56. Id. at 33-34.
57. Id. at 56.
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court.”58 The Court reasoned that a proceeding alleging a violation of
criminal law for which a juvenile may be committed to an institution is
comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution and, therefore, must be
accompanied by similar due process guarantees.59 The due process rights
extended to juveniles as a result of the Gault decision included written
notice of the charges, right to counsel, right against self-incrimination, and
the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. In subsequent cases, the
Court also established that juveniles must be proven guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt60 and that juveniles enjoy the protections of the Double
Jeopardy clause.61
Although the Gault decision heralded a due process revolution for
juveniles, the U.S. Supreme Court stopped shy of extending the full
panoply of criminal procedural rights to juveniles. The Court rejected, for
instance, that the right to trial by jury in juvenile proceedings is
constitutionally mandated62 and has upheld pretrial detention of juveniles
prior to a probable cause hearing.63 Convinced that “the Constitution does
not mandate elimination of all differences in the treatment of juveniles,”64
the Court recognized that a juvenile proceeding is fundamentally different
than an adult criminal trial. Although there is no question that juveniles are
entitled to “the essentials of due process and fair treatment,” the Court
sought to balance the informality and flexibility that characterize juvenile
proceedings with the mandated constitutional standard that the proceedings
be fundamentally fair.65
B. A More Punitive and Adversarial Juvenile System?
The second dramatic change in the juvenile justice system came as a
response to the increase in the rate of violent juvenile crime in the late
1980s and early 1990s. A relatively constant rate for juvenile violent crime
from the early 1970s to the late 1980s increased dramatically by 64%
between 1988 and 1994. At the same time the number of juveniles arrested

58. Id. at 27-28.
59. Id. at 36.
60. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
61. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
62. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). Interestingly, Oklahoma has
extended the right to a jury trial in juvenile adjudications by statute. See 10A OKLA. STAT. §
2-2-401 (2011).
63. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 283 (1984).
64. Id. at 263.
65. Id. at 288.
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for murder more than doubled between the mid-1980s and 1993.66 Fueled
by extensive media coverage of violent crimes by juveniles and mounting
public concern over a perceived epidemic of violent juvenile crime,67 all but
a few states instituted reforms which tended to treat juveniles more like
adults with a corresponding shift in philosophy away from rehabilitation
and towards punishment.68 This “get tough” on juvenile crime response
from state legislatures sparked a period of intense legislative activity that
began in the late 1980s and continued through the end of the 1990s.
Despite a steady decline in juvenile crime and violence rates since the 1994
peak, states have not sought to roll back the shift in focus.69
Signaling a shift away from traditional notions of individualized
dispositions based on the best interests of the juvenile, a significant number
of states amended their juvenile code purpose statements during the 1990s.
Typically, a traditional statement of legislative purpose attached to a
juvenile code espouses an intent “to secure for each minor . . . such care and
guidance . . . as will serve the moral, emotional, mental, and physical
welfare of the minor and the best interests of the community.”70
Amendments to juvenile code purpose statements, however, replaced the
goal of rehabilitation with punishment or accountability as the primary goal
for the juvenile justice system, emphasizing, for instance, public safety, the
seriousness of the offense, children’s obligations to society, and rendering
appropriate punishment.71 By the end of the 1997 legislative session, a
third of the states had redefined their juvenile court purpose clauses to
emphasize public safety, certain sanctions, and/or offender accountability.72

66. Patricia Torbet & Linda Szymanski, State Legislative Responses to Violent Juvenile
Crime: 1996-97 Update, JUVENILE JUST. BULL. (Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency
Prevention, Wash., D.C.), Nov. 1998, at 2.
67. Although there was a spike in violent juvenile crime in the early 1990s, the juvenile
crime rate actually peaked in 1993 and declined during the second half of that decade.
Public alarm, and the resulting legislative reaction, was stimulated at least in part by the
excessive hype of the media. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth,
81 TEX. L. REV. 799, 807-08 (2003); see also COAL. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, FALSE IMAGES:
THE NEWS MEDIA AND JUVENILE CRIME: 1997 ANNUAL REPORT (1997).
68. Patrick Griffin, Sean Addie, Benjamin Adams & Kathy Firestine, Trying Juveniles
as Adults: An Analysis of State Transfer Laws and Reporting, NAT’L REP. SERIES BULL.,
Sept. 2011, at 1.
69. Id. at 9.
70. Feld, supra note 44, at 709 (citations omitted).
71. Id.
72. Torbet & Szymanski, supra note 66, at 9.
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In addition to the symbolic change in purpose statements, more
substantive reforms included changes designed to make it easier to
prosecute juveniles in adult criminal court. Legislatures in nearly every
state revised their laws to lower the age at which a juvenile can be tried as
an adult and broaden the range of felonies that can result in adult
prosecution, shift decision-making authority from judges to prosecutors,
and replace individualized discretion with automatic mechanisms.73 Other
common reforms included adding the existence of a prior record as a factor
in waiver to adult court, increasing the maximum age beyond the normal
age of majority for juvenile commitment, revising traditional confidentiality
provisions in favor of more open proceedings and records, and including
victims of juvenile crime as “active participants” in the juvenile justice
process. The result of these changes to the traditional juvenile court
jurisdiction has been an erosion of the boundary between the adult and
juvenile systems.74
C. Juvenile Brains Are Different
A third variable raising the salience of juvenile competency issues is the
growing scientific understanding of the differences between adolescent and
adult brain function. New research has disproven the long-held assumption
that brain development is complete by puberty. Rather, neurologists have
found that adolescence is a critical time for brain development, with
dramatic changes to the brain’s structure and function.75
Utilizing relatively new imaging technology, magnetic resonance
imaging (MRI), scientists have been able to track the changes in individual
brains as they mature.76 These longitudinal neuroimaging studies have
given scientists new insights into the patterns of teenage brain development
and revealed that remarkable changes occur in the brain during the teen

73. Griffin et al., supra note 68, at 1, 9.
74. For a comprehensive analysis of the trends in the states’ responses to the escalating
serious crimes by juveniles in the 1990s, see PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, STATE RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME (1996).
75. See generally NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, PUB. NO. 11-4929, THE TEEN BRAIN:
STILL UNDER CONSTRUCTION (2011), available at http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/public
cations/the-teen-brain-still-under-construction/complete-index.shtml.
76. See, e.g., Jay N. Giedd et al., Brain Development During Childhood and
Adolescence: A Longitudinal MRI Study, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 861 (1999), available at
http://www.math.tau.ac.il/~dms/Longitudinal/brain_MRI.pdf.
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years.77 These enormous changes impact the way adolescents process and
react to information and, as a result, teenagers are more likely to be shortsighted, have poor impulse control, be driven by emotions, and be
susceptible to peer pressure. These factors reduce adolescents’ ability to
make rational decisions about their actions and contribute to poor decisionmaking.78
In a series of recent cases, the U.S. Supreme Court relied upon, at least in
part, this newly understood neuroscientific distinction between adult and
adolescent brains in reminding us that “children cannot be viewed simply as
miniature adults.”79 This distinction led the Court to abolish the juvenile
death penalty,80 both juvenile sentences of life without the possibility of
parole for non-homicide crimes81 and mandatory life without parole for
homicide,82 and to rule that the Miranda custody test must include a child’s
age in its analysis.83
The Court has repeatedly acknowledged the growing scientific evidence
that young brains are simply not fully mature in their judgment, problemsolving, and decision-making capabilities. In finding that the death penalty
is not appropriate for youth under age eighteen in Roper v. Simmons, Justice
Anthony Kennedy noted that scientific and sociological studies have
confirmed significant differences between adults and juveniles in maturity,
responsibility, and other traits.84 The Court was explicit in its reliance on
developmental research, citing studies referenced in amicus briefs of both
the American Medical Association and the American Psychological and
Psychiatric Associations.
Writing again for the majority in Graham v. Florida, which struck down
juvenile life without parole sentences, Justice Kennedy was even more
explicit about scientific findings on adolescent brain development.
77. NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, PUB. NO. 01-4929, TEENAGE BRAIN: A WORK IN
PROGRESS (2008), available at http://wwwapps.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/teenagebrain-a-work-in-progress.shtml.
78. For a summary of the scientific research on adolescent brain development and the
possible implications for the juvenile justice system, see ACTION FOR CHILDREN OF N.C.,
PUTTING THE JUVENILE BACK IN JUVENILE JUSTICE (2007), available at http://www.ncchild.
org/sites/default/files/Juvenile_Justice_Raising_The_Age_Brief_final.pdf.
79. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2404 (2011) (citing Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982)).
80. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
81. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
82. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (U.S. 2012).
83. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2399.
84. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
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Kennedy reiterated the developmental research cited in Roper and noted the
recent neuroscientific research findings on the continuing development of
adolescent brains: “[D]evelopments in psychology and brain science
continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult
minds. For example, parts of the brain involved in behavior control
continue to mature through late adolescence.”85
Justice Sotomayor grounded the Court’s juvenile Miranda decision in
the “commonsense” of the differences between children and adults and the
Court’s longstanding recognition of those distinctions.86 In concluding that
age is both a relevant and an objective circumstance that must be included
in the Miranda custody analysis, the Court noted that scientific research
“confirms what experience bears out.”87
Writing for the Court in Miller v. Alabama, Justice Elana Kagan not only
echoed the same scientific refrain, but asserted that “[t]he evidence . . .
indicates that the science and social science supporting Roper’s and
Graham’s conclusions have become even stronger.”88 Justice Kagan
actually referred to the “incompetencies associated with youth” in
explaining why chronological age must be a consideration in sentencing
juveniles convicted of homicide offenses.89 The Court’s holding that
mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles violates the Eight
Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment rests in part, once
again, on the neuroscientific distinction between adult and adolescent
brains.
The Court’s refusal to ignore age in these four recent juvenile cases and
its acknowledgement of and reliance upon the scientific evidence of
adolescent brain research may have “opened the door to a broader
examination of age in other contexts, with potentially far-reaching
implications for children involved in the justice system.”90 Based on these
decisions, the Court may be open to considering the most recent scientific
studies on how adolescent brain development impacts adjudicative
competency. Indeed, Justice Kagan’s majority opinion in Miller explicitly
85. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 (citing Brief for the American Medical Ass’n et al. as
Amici Curiae at 16-24, Graham (No. 08-7412); Brief for American Psychological Ass’n et
al. as Amici Curiae at 22-27, Graham)).
86. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2403 n.5.
87. Id. at 2403 n.5.
88. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465, n.5 (U.S. 2012).
89. Id. at 2468.
90. Marsha Levick, J.D.B. v. North Carolina: The U.S. Supreme Court Heralds the
Emergence of the ‘Reasonable Juvenile’ in American Criminal Law, 89 CRIM. L. RPTR. 753
(2011).
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references a juvenile’s incapacity to assist his own attorneys as one of the
“incompetencies associated with youth.”91
Building on the new scientific understanding of brain development, the
MacArthur Juvenile Competence Study92 was the first large scale study to
explore how these brain differences affect juvenile competency to stand
trial. The study was designed to examine three basic questions: 1) whether
adolescents differ from adults in their abilities to participate in the
adjudicative process; 2) if so, in what types of youths are these differences
most apparent; and, 3) what kinds of deficits have implications for law
policy and practice?93 The study included a diverse group of 1400
participants ages eleven to twenty-four, both males and females, half in jail
or juvenile detention and half from the general population with a range of
cultural, ethnic, and socioeconomic characteristics.94 The study also
tracked data on other variables such as “experience with the justice system,
intelligence, and mental health problems.”95
Using hypotheticals designed to evaluate a variety of abilities associated
with competence, the study assessed “three key aspects of psychosocial
maturity: the ability to evaluate risk, to think about future consequences,
and to resist peer pressure”.96 Researchers used participant responses to a
series of decisions “to assess how immaturity affects the choices defendants
make”.97 In addition, study participants were evaluated with an established
instrument widely “used with adults to assess their functional abilities
related to competence,” the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool –
Criminal Adjudication.98 “Adults who score low [on this instrument] are
generally impaired by mental illness or retardation.”99
The findings of the study are startling. The results “strongly suggest that
about one-third of 11-to 13-year-olds and one-fifth of 14- to 15-year-olds
probably are not competent to stand trial.”100 The study found that many
91. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468.
92. Thomas Grisso et al., Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial: A Comparison of
Adolescents’ and Adults’ Capacities as Trial Defendants, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 333
(2003) [hereinafter MacArthur Study].
93. Id. at 336.
94. Id. at 337.
95. Laurence Steinberg, Juveniles on Trial MacArthur Foundation Study Calls
Competency into Question, 18 CRIM. JUST. 20, 22-23 (2003).
96. Id. at 22.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 23.
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adolescents lack the capacities needed to be a competent defendant,
exhibiting significant deficits in knowledge and understanding of the
judicial process, an inability “to put facts together and draw logical
conclusions, and less able than adults to think about the future
consequences of their decisions.”101
“In matters [related to trial
understanding] and reasoning about important information, 30 percent of
those 11 to 13 years old, and 19 percent of those ages 14 and 15, performed
at the level of mentally ill adults who have been found not competent to
stand trial.”102 These findings were “robust” across gender, ethnicity, and
socioeconomic status variables, as well as among both those currently in
juvenile detention and those in the general community.103 Thus, even
setting aside the more traditional issues of juvenile mental illness and
mental retardation, which current research also suggests are likely
significant and undoubtedly affect competence,104 policymakers and state
legislators must grapple with developmental immaturity as a relevant factor
for assessing juvenile competence.105
III. Where Does That Leave Oklahoma Juveniles?
Oklahoma has not been immune to the trends sweeping the juvenile
justice system and propelling the near universal move toward a right to
juvenile competency across the nation. Questions remain, however, as to
whether the impact of those trends on the juvenile justice system in
Oklahoma reaffirms or undermines the state’s refusal to recognize a
juvenile right of adjudicative competency. To answer those questions we
must examine the different ways that the state of Oklahoma treats a juvenile
under the juvenile code and the manner in which issues of juvenile
competency are addressed under each approach. This section will examine
each of those ways in order to assess whether Oklahoma’s approach to

101. Id.
102. See id. at 22-23.
103. MacArthur Study, supra note 92, at 346.
104. See David R. Katner, The Mental Health Paradigm and the MacArthur Study:
Emerging Issues Challenging the Competence of Juveniles in Delinquency Systems, 32 AM.
J.L. & MED. 503, 508-19 (2006).
105. But see Joseph B. Sanborn, Juveniles’ Competency to Stand Trial: Wading Through
the Rhetoric and the Evidence, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 135 (2009) (arguing that
studies of juvenile competence undertaken by developmental psychologists are flawed and
that there is no categorical problem of juvenile incompetency to stand trial).
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juvenile competency meets the U.S. Supreme Court’s due process standard
of “fundamental fairness” for juvenile proceedings.106
When a child under eighteen years old commits a crime in Oklahoma,
the state can treat that individual in three different ways depending on the
age of the child and the seriousness of the offense. Although the default
standard for a child under the age of eighteen is juvenile adjudication,107
Oklahoma’s Juvenile Code also provides for prosecuting and sentencing
children as adults108 or as youthful offenders,109 a status designed to avail
the juvenile of the rehabilitative services of the juvenile system, but where
an adult sentence is possible.
A. Competency in Juvenile Adjudications
Of the three trends shaping the modern juvenile justice system—a more
punitive and adversarial system, expanded due process rights, and new
understanding of the adolescent brain—at least one of those trends is
consistent with Oklahoma’s approach to competency in juvenile
adjudications.
The latest scientific research on adolescent brain
development actually reconfirms the core rationale for a separate juvenile
system, specifically that children and young adults are developmentally
different than adults and should be treated so under the law. Hard science
now reaffirms the historic justification for juvenile rehabilitation over
punishment as the focus of juvenile dispositions. The highly elastic and
malleable adolescent brain may leave young people more vulnerable to
negative influences and compromise rational decision-making but it also
provides a window of opportunity where appropriate guidance and support
will help them become responsible members of society. The very nature of
separate juvenile proceedings, just as the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals held in G.J.I., is designed to account for this developmental
distinction from adults.
If the Oklahoma juvenile system has truly remained rehabilitative rather
than become punitive like the adult criminal system, the MacArthur Study
findings may be irrelevant to juveniles who remain in juvenile court. The
MacArthur conclusion that a significant number of juveniles are likely
incompetent to participate in their own trials because of developmental
immaturity does not invalidate a system that takes into account a juvenile’s
immaturity and incompetence and constructs an individualized plan to
106.
107.
108.
109.

McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543 (1971).
10A OKLA. STAT. § 2-5-203(A) (2011).
Id. § 2-5-205(B).
Id. § 2-5-205(A).
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reach a rehabilitative result. The relevance of these findings on juvenile
competence for juveniles who remain in the juvenile court, then, turns on
how much those proceedings resemble a criminal trial and impose
punishment in the form of adult-like consequences. Not surprisingly, the
picture is mixed.
The purpose clause of the Oklahoma Juvenile Code is the first indication
of this mixed picture. Unlike a number of states that amended their purpose
clauses to embrace punishment and accountability over rehabilitation,
Oklahoma’s statute does not explicitly reference punishment as a goal.
Although the purpose of the juvenile code is to “promote the public safety
and reduce juvenile delinquency,” the means listed to accomplish this goal
focus on “the unique characteristics and needs of juveniles . . .
rehabilitation and reintegration . . . [and providing] access to opportunities
for personal and social growth.”110 There are, of course, multiple references
to developing responsibility and protecting the public, but there is no
wholesale abandonment of rehabilitation for punishment.
In addition, many of the traditional features of a rehabilitative focused
juvenile system remain, with the state acting as parens patriae. The
juvenile court is required to craft an individualized treatment plan that
identifies the conditions leading to the adjudication, the specific services to
remedy the conditions, and “the services to be provided to the
parent . . . .”111 When a child is removed from the home, a treatment plan
must detail the reason for the placement, the services to be provided, and
the services necessary to transition a child back to the community.112 A
decision to leave a child in the home must be “consistent with the welfare
of the child” and the court also has authority over a parent to require certain
conduct.113 Commitments to the custody of the Office of Juvenile Affairs
are for an indeterminate period,114 and any placement outside the home
requires a court determination that “in accordance with the best interests of
the child and protection of the public” reasonable efforts were made to
provide for the return the child to the family.115 All these dispositional
orders are required to be reviewed periodically by the court “until such time
as the conditions which caused the child to be adjudicated have been

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. § 2-1-102.
Id. § 2-2-502(A)(1)-(5).
Id. § 2-2-502(B)(1)-(4).
Id. § 2-2-503(A)(2).
Id. § 2-2-503(A)(5).
Id. § 2-2-503(A)(10).
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corrected,”116 with each review focusing on the services being provided to
the child and directing additional services to be provided “to protect the
child from further physical, mental or emotional harm or to correct the
conditions that led to the adjudication.” 117 Presumably, the court considers
elements of competency, such as maturity, mental illness, and functional
ability to assist counsel in presenting the facts, in determining an
appropriate individualized treatment plan for the juvenile.
While the Oklahoma juvenile system remains individualized and focused
on rehabilitation at its heart, nevertheless, juvenile adjudications
increasingly resemble criminal convictions because of their serious
consequences, both direct and collateral. At the outset, a juvenile
adjudication can result in a loss of liberty: the juvenile can be made a ward
of the state, be placed on probation, be required to undergo counseling, be
removed from home and placed in the custody of a private institution or
group home, or placed in the custody of the Office of Juvenile Affairs for
an indeterminate period of time.118 As the U.S. Supreme Court recognized
in Gault: “A proceeding where the issue is whether the child will be found
to be ‘delinquent’ and subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is
comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution.” 119 Even rehabilitation
sanctions can involve a major loss of a child’s liberty.
A juvenile’s loss of liberty may be an incidental cost of a rehabilitative
disposition, but other serious ramifications of a delinquency adjudication
resemble a criminal conviction and may be motivated more by punishment
(and perhaps public safety) than rehabilitation. For instance, juvenile
adjudications are predicates for the filing of adult felony charges,120 are
used in certification determinations for youthful offender121 and adult122
status, may require registration as a juvenile sex offender,123 or possible
transfer from the juvenile sex offender registry to the adult sex offender
registry.124 Juvenile records are no longer as private as they once were125
and may be used to enhance future adult sentences.126 These serious
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. § 2-2-504(A)(1).
Id. § 2-2-504(C).
Id. § 2-2-503.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967).
See 21 OKLA. STAT. § 1283(D) (2011).
10A OKLA. STAT. § 2-5-101 (2011).
Id. § 2-2-403(A)(4).
Id. §§ 2-8-102 to 2-8-107.
Id. § 2-8-108.
Id. § 2-6-108.
18 U.S.C.S. app. § 4A1.2 (2012).
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consequences are generally unrelated to the rehabilitative function of the
juvenile process and suggest a more punitive result, thus raising issues of
competency.
In addition to the punitive consequences of juvenile adjudications, the
state’s decades-long struggle to provide appropriate treatment in its juvenile
facilities raises questions about the punitive nature of those facilities.
Oklahoma has been subject to two consent decrees as a result of lawsuits
challenging its treatment of juveniles. The first consent decree was a result
of a 1978 class action lawsuit, known as Terry D.,127 which alleged that
children were subjected to abusive use of restraints, solitary confinement,
and the use of tranquilizing drugs to control juveniles, rather than treat
them. In addition, children who had not committed any criminal act, such
as status offenders and victims of neglect, were housed with those who had
been adjudicated of crimes.128 The lawsuit resulted in a detailed 1984
consent decree requiring the state to dramatically change its approach to
confining juveniles, including a mandate to place children in state custody
in the least restrictive alternative located near his/her home, limitations on
the use of solitary confinement and a ban on confining any non-offender in
an institution.129
In 2006, the state was sued again in federal court, this time by the Justice
Department, for reported problems at the L.E. Rader Center, such as
physical assaults, suicide attempts, and sexual assaults within the juvenile
detention center.130 Yet another consent decree was signed in September
2008 and contained nearly 100 requirements to address problems of
juvenile safety, suicide prevention, inappropriate sexual behavior,
inappropriate use of restraints, mental-health services, and special
education.131 Despite a last-minute emergency motion by the Justice
Department to extend the decree due to “continued non-compliance” with
the terms of the agreement, the consent decree expired in 2011.132

127. Terry D. v. Rader, 93 F.R.D. 576 (W.D. Okla. 1982); Paul Sweeney, Oklahoma
Juvenile Officials Agree to Sweeping Changes, 8 CORRECTIONS MAG. 39 (1982).
128. Sweeney, supra note 127, at 41.
129. Id.
130. United States v. Oklahoma, Case No. 06-CV-673-GKF-FHM (N.D. Okla. filed Dec.
15, 2006).
131. Id.
132. United States v. Oklahoma, Case No. 06-CV-673-GKF-FHM, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 107370 at *12 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 21, 2011); see also David Harper, DOJ Files for
Extension of Rader Decree, TULSA WORLD, Sept. 2, 2011, http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/
article.aspx?subjectid=11&articleid=20110902_11_A1_TheUSD537089.
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Although the era of consent decrees appears to be at an end, the state’s
long history in failing to meet the rehabilitative needs of juveniles in the
system is troubling. There are also concerns that a number of new
initiatives aimed at controlling a recent wave of violence in juvenile
facilities, including the use of pepper spray, Tasers, restraints, and solitary
confinement, reflect a move away from a rehabilitative model to a more
punitive corrections model.133 Despite the traditional parens patriae
features of Oklahoma’s juvenile code, where juvenile competency issues
are accounted for through individualized dispositions and rehabilitation, it
appears that children who remain in the juvenile system nevertheless are
subject to an increasingly punitive system where competency may be a due
process requirement.
The juvenile due process expansion transformed juvenile proceedings in
Oklahoma just as it did across the nation. The rights flowing from Gault
and its progeny are fundamental constitutional rights protected by both the
federal Constitution and the Oklahoma state Constitution and recognized by
our state and federal courts at all levels.134 In fact, Oklahoma has not only
upheld and endorsed the due process protections recognized by the U.S.
Supreme Court, but has expanded those rights to include a right to trial by
jury.135
Although due process is a flexible concept which “calls for such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands,”136 the U.S.
Supreme Court has endorsed “fundamental fairness” as the applicable due
process standard for juvenile proceedings.137 The due process rights
accorded juveniles from Gault—notice, right to counsel, right against self-

133. Barbara Hoberock, Reforms on Juvenile Justice Centers Losing Ground, TULSA
WORLD, Oct. 8, 2011, http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/article.aspx?subjectid=336&article
id=20111008_16_A1_CUTLIN247397.
134. For Oklahoma state cases and statutes recognizing the rights established in Gault,
see for example, Crandell v. State, 539 P.2d 398,401 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975) and 10A
OKLA. STAT. § 2-2-107 (2011) (notice of charges); J.T.P. v. Oklahoma, 544 P.2d 1270,
1276-77 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975) and 10A OKLA. STAT. § 2-2-301(A), (C) (right to counsel);
J.T.P., 544 P.2d at 1277-78 and 10A OKLA. STAT. §2-2-402(B) (right against selfincrimination); D.M.H. v Oklahoma, 136 P.3d 1054, 1055 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006) and 10A
OKLA. STAT. § 2-2-402(C) (right to confrontation and cross examination); In re J.E.S., 585
P.2d 382, 383 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978) (right to beyond a reasonable doubt standard); and
D.M.H., 136 P3d at 1056 and 10A OKLA. STAT. § 2-2-401 (right to a trial).
135. See 10A OKLA. STAT. § 2-2-401.
136. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
137. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 543 (1971).
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incrimination, right to confront witnesses—are thus fundamental to a fair
proceeding. In the context of adult criminal trials, the U.S. Supreme Court
has made clear that competence is required to exercise the very rights that
are fundamental to a fair juvenile proceeding:
Competence to stand trial is rudimentary, for upon it depends the
main part of those rights deemed essential to a fair trial,
including the right to effective assistance of counsel, the rights to
summon, to confront, and to cross-examine witnesses, and the
right to testify on one's own behalf or to remain silent without
penalty for doing so.138
If competence is a prerequisite to exercising essential adult trial rights, is
competence also a prerequisite to exercising those same rights in a juvenile
adjudication? In other words, are the juvenile due process rights from
Gault meaningless without competency? Like the relevance of the
scientific findings on juvenile brain development to a need for juvenile
adjudicative competency, the answer to that question may also depend on
how much a juvenile proceeding resembles an adult criminal trial and
imposes adult-like consequences. As we have seen, that picture is mixed,
with a traditional parens patriae rehabilitative statutory scheme somewhat
eroded by increasingly severe consequences and the state’s struggle to
provide consistent rehabilitative services.
As discussed above, whether juvenile brain science discoveries and
expanded due process rights mandate a right to competency for juveniles in
Oklahoma is dependent in part upon the extent to which the third trend in
the evolution of juvenile justice, a more punitive model of juvenile justice,
has impacted the nature of juvenile proceedings in the state and
overshadowed the rehabilitative model. For youth who remain subject to
traditional juvenile adjudication, where dispositions still result in an
individualized treatment plan geared to the best interest of the child,139
competency issues arise less from the proceeding and disposition itself and
more from the consequences of being adjudicated delinquent. That results
in a somewhat mixed picture for juveniles who remain in juvenile court for
adjudication. Consistent with the more punitive trend, however, Oklahoma
has crafted policies that subject more juveniles to adult proceedings and
sanctions, where competency issues are undeniably relevant and only
partially addressed. For those children prosecuted or sentenced as adults or
138. Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 354 (1996) (citing Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S.
127, 139-40 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
139. 10A OKLA. STAT. §§ 2-2-501 to 2-2-504.
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youthful offenders, punishment replaces individualized rehabilitative
dispositions and transforms a juvenile proceeding into a criminal one
requiring all the due process protections to which a criminal defendant is
entitled, including competency to stand trial. In short, the rationale that the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals relied upon in refusing to recognize a
juvenile competency right in G.J.I.—that the proceedings were
“specifically not criminal” and “directed towards rehabilitation”—simply
does not apply when children are prosecuted and sentenced in adult
criminal court.
B. Children Prosecuted and Sentenced as Adults
In Oklahoma, a child of any age who is charged with an act which would
be a felony if committed by an adult may be certified as an adult and treated
as an adult in every way by the criminal justice system,140 including being
incarcerated with adults upon conviction.141 More specific provisions of the
Juvenile Code require that a child as young as thirteen charged with first
degree murder “shall be held accountable for the act as if the person were
an adult,”142 unless the court “reverse” certifies the child as a youthful
offender or a juvenile. These certification decisions, either to prosecute a
child of any age on a felony charge in adult court or, conversely, to return a
thirteen- or fourteen-year-old accused of first degree murder from adult to
juvenile court, require the court to conduct a hearing and make findings
based on a list of statutory factors supported by clear and convincing
evidence.143 However, youths who are fifteen to seventeen years old and
charged with first degree murder must be treated as adults, with no option to
convince a judge to certify the child as a youthful offender or juvenile.144
In addition, Oklahoma has a once-an-adult-always-an-adult provision such
that once a child has been certified to stand trial as an adult or for the
imposition of an adult sentence, that child will always be treated as an adult
and will not be subject to juvenile court jurisdiction for any future
proceedings.145
Under the Youthful Offender Act, juveniles as young as fifteen may be
subject to adult sentences through another certification process or if the
juvenile fails to comply with the treatment plan ordered by the court or
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. § 2-2-403.
Id. § 2-5-204(F).
Id. § 2-5-205(A).
Id. §§ 2-2-403, 2-2-205.
Id. § 2-5-205(B).
Id. § 2-5-204(G).
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engages in other prohibited behavior.146 Oklahoma’s Youthful Offender
Act has provided a blended sentencing option between the criminal and
juvenile courts since 1998.147 The Act, which elevates public safety and
accountability over rehabilitation in dealing with juveniles who commit
more serious crimes,148 is applicable to juveniles fifteen to seventeen years
old who are charged with a statutory list of serious felonies.149 Oklahoma
criminal courts have jurisdiction over children charged as youthful
offenders and the prosecution proceeds exactly the same as it would in adult
criminal court.150 Convicted youthful offenders are subject to the same type
of sentencing procedures and duration of sentence as an adult convicted of a
felony offense. The distinction is that unless the child has been certified for
an adult sentence, a youthful offender sentence is served in the custody or
under the supervision of the Office of Juvenile Affairs, where the youth
may still receive appropriate rehabilitation services.151 The Office of
Juvenile Affairs prepares a rehabilitation plan for the child, identifying the
goals along with the programs and services to be provided to meet those
objectives.152 The court periodically reviews the progress of the youthful
offender and may, based on additional offenses, bad behavior, or failure to
follow the rehabilitative plan, transfer him to the custody of the Department

146. Id. § 2-5-208.
147. Id. § 2-5-201.
148. Id. § 2-5-202(B).
149. Fifteen to seventeen year olds are held accountable as youthful offenders for: 1)
Murder in the second degree; 2) Kidnapping; 3) Manslaughter in the first degree; 4) Robbery
with a dangerous weapon or a firearm or attempt thereof; 5) Robbery in the first degree or
attempt thereof; 6) Rape in the first degree or attempt thereof; 7) Rape by instrumentation or
attempt thereof; 8) Forcible sodomy; 9) Lewd molestation; 10) Arson in the first degree or
attempt thereof; or 11) Any offense in violation of Section 652 of Title 21 of the Oklahoma
Statutes. Id. § 2-5-206(A).
Sixteen and seventeen year-olds are held accountable as youthful offenders for: 1)
Burglary in the first degree or attempted burglary in the first degree; 2) Battery or assault
and battery on a state employee or contractor while in the custody or supervision of the
Office of Juvenile Affairs; 3)Aggravated assault and battery of a police officer; 4)
Intimidating a witness; 5) Trafficking in or manufacturing illegal drugs; 6) Assault or assault
and battery with a deadly weapon; 7) Maiming; 8) Residential burglary in the second degree
after certain prior offenses; 9) Rape in the second degree; or 10) Use of a firearm while in
commission of a felony. Id. § 2-5-206(B).
150. Id. § 2-5-204.
151. Id. § 2-5-209.
152. Id. § 2-5-210.
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of Corrections to complete his sentence in adult prison.153 In essence, a
youthful offender is tried as an adult and given an adult criminal sentence
that is deferred as long as he takes advantage of the rehabilitative services
provided in the juvenile system. A court order transferring a youthful
offender to the custody of the Department of Corrections is deemed an adult
conviction with all the ramifications of such.
These provisions reflect the national trend of a more punitive juvenile
system and raise questions of juvenile competency to stand trial for those
Oklahoma youths prosecuted or sentenced in adult criminal court. Even if
you accept G.J.I.’s contention that issues of competency are adequately
accounted for in the juvenile system, despite the fact that consequences
have become markedly more punitive and rehabilitation harder to come by,
juveniles remain vulnerable to due process competency violations in the
context of adult treatment and in the certification process itself.
C. Competency for Juveniles in Adult Criminal Court
Of course, once a juvenile is certified to stand trial as an adult or as a
youthful offender, the child has all the statutory and constitutional rights
and protections of an adult accused of a crime,154 including the right to
competency. What remains uncertain in Oklahoma is whether a juvenile’s
developmental immaturity and resulting lack of capacity to assist
effectively in her defense would render her incompetent to stand trial under
either the Dusky/Drope standard or the state competency statute. Given the
conclusions of the MacArthur Study regarding the significant numbers of
juveniles whose adjudicative capabilities mirror mentally ill adults who
have been found incompetent to stand trial,155 this question is worthy of an
answer.
While a majority of states have extended the right of adjudicative
competency to juveniles, states are split on whether developmental
immaturity alone is a legitimate source of incompetence.156 Most states use
the Dusky/Drope functional standard to assess juvenile competency, but
some states require that the incompetence come from mental illness or

153. The court must also decide whether to transfer a youthful offender to adult prison
once he or she reaches the age of 18, when the Office of Juvenile Affairs no longer has
jurisdiction over the individual. See id. § 2-5-209.
154. Id. § 2-5-204(C).
155. See MacArthur Study, supra note 92, at 346.
156. Twila A. Wingrove, Is Immaturity a Legitimate Source of Incompetence to Avoid
Standing Trial in Juvenile Court?, 86 NEB. L. REV. 488, 506 (2007).
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mental retardation rather than immaturity alone.157 Only a few states
explicitly allow for developmental immaturity to serve as a component in
juvenile competency determinations. For example, the Iowa Court of
Appeals stated:
Limiting incompetency in delinquency proceedings to cases in
which the child is incompetent by reason of a “mental disorder”
would fail to recognize that a juveniles’ inability to appreciate
the charge, understand the proceedings, or assist effectively in
the defense may be the result of immaturity, lack of intellectual
capacity, or both. We conclude that limiting determinations of
incompetency in juvenile cases to those cases in which the
inability to appreciate, understand, and assist is based on a
“mental disorder” would offend rights to due process.158
Similarly, at least three other states have identified immaturity as a
legitimate source of incompetence for juveniles either through statute or
case law.159
Oklahoma’s competency standard, like the ABA Criminal Justice Mental
Health Standards, does not tie incompetence to mental illness but rather,
“[t]he test . . . is whether the accused has sufficient ability to consult with
his lawyer and has a rational as well as actual understanding of the
proceedings against him.”160 Under that standard, competency assessments
for juveniles facing criminal court in Oklahoma should factor in the
developmental features and unique maturity issues that can adversely affect
a child’s ability to assist in her defense. The Dusky/Drope competence
standard established by the Supreme Court and embraced by Oklahoma’s
competency statute and case law is a functional test; therefore, it should
make no difference whether the source of the defendant’s inability to
function is mental illness or immaturity. In short, in order to ensure due
process for children prosecuted or sentenced in adult criminal court,
157. Douglass Mossman et al., AAPL Practice Guideline for the Forensic Psychiatric
Evaluation of Competence to Stand Trial, 35 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. S52 (Supp.
2005); see, e.g., Washington v. Swenson-Tucker, No. 32944-7-II, 2006 Wash. App. LEXIS
242 at *13 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2006) (upholding a finding of competence for an eightyear-old because his “limitations are the result of developmental deficits, not mental disease
or defect”).
158. In re A.B., No. 05-0868, 715 N.W.2d 767 (Table), 2006 WL 469945 at *3 (Iowa
App., Mar. 1, 2006).
159. See Wingrove, supra note 156, at 508 (identifying Florida, Michigan and Ohio as
recognizing that immaturity may impact competency).
160. Bryson v. State, 876 P.2d 240, 249 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (citation omitted).
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Oklahoma courts should apply a competency standard to juveniles that
takes into consideration their unique development and maturity issues.
The loudest criticism of this approach is that children who commit
serious crimes simply would not be held accountable for their criminal
actions. If a sizeable proportion of younger adolescents are unfit to stand
trial, what would the state do with them after certifying them to adult
criminal court but declaring them incompetent to proceed? Adult
defendants who are found incompetent to stand trial may not be held
indefinitely for treatment to restore competency.161 There must be a
prospect for the defendant’s successful restoration within a reasonable time
and “his continued commitment must be justified by progress toward that
goal.”162 The same would be true for children, but courts would certainly
be reluctant to detain immature adolescents long enough for them to grow
up and gain competency. The simple answer is to send incompetent youths
back to juvenile court where their immaturity is better accounted for and
rehabilitative services are more likely available.
Advocates for harsher youth sentences, who have argued that “adult time
for adult crime” serves as a strong deterrent and is an effective response to
more serious and often violent juvenile crime, would balk at sending
serious young offenders back to juvenile court based on maturity-based
incompetence. But recent research shows that prosecuting youths in the
adult system is ineffective and actually may lead to more crime, not less.
According to both the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, youths who are
transferred from the juvenile court system to the adult criminal system are
approximately 34% more likely than youths retained in the juvenile court
system to be rearrested for violent or other crime.163 Researchers with the
MacArthur Foundation Research Network on Adolescent Development and
Juvenile Justice reported similar findings from a study of more than 2000
New York and New Jersey juveniles, drawn from two jurisdictions with
dramatically different approaches to handling juvenile offenders. The study
161. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
162. Id.
163. Robert Hanh et al., Effects on Violence of Laws and Policies Facilitating the
Transfer of Youth from the Juvenile to the Adult Justice System: A Report on
Recommendations of the Task Force on Community Preventative Services, MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WEEKLY REP., Nov. 30, 2007, at 6; Richard E. Redding, Juvenile Transfer
Laws: An Effective Deterrent to Delinquency?, JUVENILE JUST. BULL. (Office of Juvenile
Justice & Delinquency Prevention, Wash., D.C.), June 2010, available at http://nicic.gov/
Library/023262.
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concluded that “results suggest that harsher sentences and adult punishment
are ineffective deterrents to crime among the juveniles in this sample.”164
In addition, a recent Baltimore, Maryland study found that, among other
things, the adult justice system teaches teens to become violent criminals,
subjects them to sexual and physical abuse, wastes taxpayer money, and
unfairly targets African Americans.165
These findings are not particularly surprising. There are limited services
in the adult system and youth often become socialized into a violent
institutional culture where adult criminals are the role models.166 Returning
incompetent youths to juvenile court would save money in the long run by
decreasing reoffending and increasing the odds that youth offenders will be
rehabilitated in the juvenile system and become productive members of
society.167 Implementing a competency standard for juveniles in adult court
that considers developmental immaturity as a factor is the first step to
correcting these unintended consequences of juvenile transfer and
protecting the due process rights of juveniles in adult court. The second
area requiring action on juvenile competency is in the certification process
itself.
D. Competency in the Certification Process
The certification process itself—where a court determines whether a
child will be tried as an adult or a youthful offender or subject to an adult
sentence—raises a more troubling competency concern. The consequences
of being certified as an adult or a youthful offender and subject to an adult
sentence are obviously significant and potentially severe. Nevertheless, a
child has no right to be competent to participate in the certification process
that may ultimately result in an adult criminal trial or sentence. The
decisions that juveniles have to make with their attorney in a certification
hearing are no less complex than in a criminal trial and certainly require
that the juvenile be able to effectively and rationally assist their attorney. If
the central rationale that animates the right to competency is fairness, is it

164. MACARTHUR FOUND. RESEARCH NETWORK ON ADOLESCENT DEV. & JUVENILE
JUSTICE, THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE
ADULT CRIMINAL COURT 1 (Issue Brief 5, n.d.).
165. See Tricia Bishop, Report Says Trying Juveniles as Adults is Counterproductive,
BALTIMORE SUN, Oct. 4, 2010, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2010-10-04/news/bs-mdjust-kids-partnership-20101004_1_juvenile-system-baltimore-jail-juvenile-court.
166. CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, JAILING JUVENILES 7-8 (2007).
167. MICHELLE DEITCH ET AL., FROM TIME OUT TO HARD TIME: YOUNG CHILDREN IN THE
ADULT CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 64 (2009).
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fair to certify a juvenile to the adult court if she is incompetent to provide
assistance to her attorney in the hearing that makes that determination?
It is true that the court is bound to consider something akin to
competency in making some certification decisions, even though the
juvenile need not be competent to participate in the certification hearing
itself. Among the statutory factors that the court is required to consider in
order to certify a juvenile as an adult168 or youthful offender169 or impose an
adult sentence170 is an assessment of the sophistication and maturity of the
accused and their capability of distinguishing right from wrong. Typically,
the court has the benefit of a psychological evaluation as part of the
investigation that accompanies such a motion, but that does not address the
problem of a juvenile being competent enough to assist counsel in the
hearing itself, which could lead to a significant deprivation of liberty.
Competence is not always a factor in the decision to prosecute a child in
adult court, however. Where there is a statutory mandate that a youth who
commits certain serious crimes will be treated as an adult, the factors the
court may consider in a “reverse certification” back to the juvenile court or
to youthful offender status do not include developmental immaturity or
other aspects of adjudicative competency.171 The only factors the court may
weigh in deciding to remove the youth from adult court include the manner
in which the alleged offense was committed, whether the offense was
against persons or property, the record and past history of the child, and the
prospects for adequate protection of the public.172 For instance, a thirteenyear-old charged with first degree murder must be tried in adult court.
Although he could petition the court to certify him as a child and return the
matter to juvenile court jurisdiction, there is no provision for the court to
consider his competency to assist his lawyer in his defense or to understand
the proceedings against him in making that determination. In fact, the
statutory language seems to suggest the court is precluded from considering
competency at all in that situation.173
The Supreme Court has held that a proceeding that results in waiver to
adult court is a “critically important” stage in the juvenile court process and
must be accompanied by minimum requirements of due process and fair
168. 10A OKLA. STAT. § 2-2-403(A)(3) (2011).
169. Id. § 2-5-205(E)(4).
170. Id. § 2-5-208(C)(2)(d).
171. Id. § 2-5-101(E).
172. Id.
173. “When ruling on the certification motion of the accused person, the court shall give
consideration to the following guidelines, listed in order of importance.” Id. § 2-5-101(E).
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treatment.174 Given the grave consequences of adult criminal court, those
minimum due process protections should include an assessment of
competency prior to proceeding with a certification hearing of any kind.
Even though Oklahoma’s competency statute does not explicitly mention
juveniles, it does apply to every stage of a criminal proceeding after arrest
and before judgment including but not limited to, interrogation, lineup,
preliminary hearing, motion dockets, discovery, pretrial hearings, and
trial.175 A certification hearing certainly is implied in that list.
IV. Conclusion
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the right to be competent to stand
trial is a fundamental right essential to fairness and due process about which
there is no question.176 The significance of the right is the key role it plays
in ensuring a fair and accurate trial. The trends shaping the modern
juvenile justice system—the expansion of juvenile due process rights, the
punitive juvenile justice reforms, and the growing understanding of the
unique features of the adolescent brain—have propelled other states to
acknowledge a right of competency in juvenile proceedings. In the twentytwo years since the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals rejected that right
as unnecessary, those trends have changed the landscape of juvenile justice
in Oklahoma enough to warrant a second look at our outlier position on
juvenile competency.
Even if we accept the assertion that Oklahoma’s juvenile system remains
true to its parens patriae foundations, with a judge acting as a benevolent
parent in the best interests of the child to meet individualized, rehabilitative
goals, it is reasonable to reexamine the Oklahoma approach to juvenile
competency in the face of the overwhelming consensus of virtually every
other state. An examination of the shifting landscape of Oklahoma’s
juvenile justice system and the different ways juveniles are treated under
the law reveals at least two circumstances where due process demands that
youths are competent to proceed. First, where juveniles are prosecuted or
sentenced in adult court they should be entitled to a competency standard
that takes into consideration their unique development and maturity issues.

174. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966) (“It is clear beyond dispute that the
waiver of jurisdiction is a ‘critically important’ action determining vitally important
statutory rights of the juvenile.”); id. at 562 (“[W]e do hold that the hearing must measure up
to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.”).
175. 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1175.1(4) (2011) (emphasis added).
176. Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 354 (1996).
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And second, any certification process that makes that determination about
whether a child will be prosecuted or sentenced in an adult criminal court
should be preceded by a finding of adjudicative competence. Making these
adjustments to account for the changes in the juvenile system since G.J.I
was decided twenty-two years ago is consistent with Oklahoma’s
commitment to both a rehabilitative parens patriae philosophy and due
process of law.
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